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The Cuban Missile Crisis At 50

Five decades later, lessons are still being learned from the most dangerous days in history
Peter Kornbluh
Posted: October 12, 2012

This weekend begins the observation of the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the November/December issue of Cigar Aficionado, Peter Kornbluh, an expert on history's closest brush with a Third World War, describes the events through recently declassified documents. Here is an excerpt from the article. See the entire article in Cigar Aficionado, available soon on newsstands. 

The Castro 'Approach'

It took almost 30 years after the missile crisis for historians to obtain confirmation of the basic facts of the secret missile swap. And more than 25 years for former members of the ExComm to reveal that Kennedy was so committed to resolving the crisis that he established a back-channel to United Nations Secretary General U Thant, in case Khrushchev did not accept the trade. At a Florida conference of surviving Kennedy administration officials in 1987, Sorensen read a letter from Dean Rusk in which he described a top secret presidential message he had transmitted to U Thant through an emissary in New York late in the evening of October 27. If needed, U Thant was to undertake his own UN initiative to end the crisis, calling on the Soviets to withdraw the missiles in Cuba, and the U.S. to withdraw the missiles in Turkey. A UN proposal, the message inferred, would provide Kennedy with the needed political cover to agree publicly to such a deal.

But in addition to his negotiations with Khrushchev and secret channel to the UN, the most enduring secret of the missile crisis diplomacy was that Kennedy actually made an approach to Castro, reaching out to the fiery Cuban leader through a third-country intermediary in a concerted effort to bring the crisis to an end. This hidden history, recorded in secret communiqués and cables discovered in the foreign ministry archives of Brazil by George Washington University historian James Hershberg, revealed the President's commitment to leave no stone unturned to get the Russian missiles out of Cuba-without them being fired. 

At the very first ExComm meeting on October 16, when most senior officials were focusing on attacking Cuba, Secretary of State Rusk had pushed the President to consider the alternative of "getting some word to Castro." Since Washington had severed diplomatic relations with Havana at the end of the Eisenhower administration, Rusk suggested using Canada's ambassador as an emissary to pass this message to Fidel: "Cuba is being victimized here...the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.... The time has now come when he must take the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, [and] prevent this missile base from becoming operational."  

Kennedy's initial response was to simply suggest that "[I] don't think the message to Castro has much in it." But after his dramatic October 22 presidential address to the nation, the President ordered the ExComm to look again at "alternative courses of action" to the use of force. In response, the State Department produced a top secret report that revisited the option of "approaching Castro." The idea was to coax Castro to eject the missiles along with the Soviets by opening the door to Cuba's return to the West. The U.S. would point out that "Cuba was merely being exploited in the interests of the Soviet Union and that any of the possible paths by which the Cuban crisis can be expected to develop will result in the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction."

The State Department report added that Washington would "have to give some assurances, regardless of whether we intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves undertake to overthrow the regime or support others trying to do so." A handwritten note scribbled by an NSC official captured the essence of this approach: "Get word to Castro once ships turn back that if he kicks out Sovs we can live w. him."

Such an approach "would be made to Castro through a Latin American representative in Cuba, probably the Brazilian ambassador," the State Department recommended. Headed by the populist president João Goulart, Brazil had maintained strong ties to Cuba after the revolution, and a longstanding interest in being a mediator to improve U.S.--Cuban relations.

At the ExComm meeting on October 26, President Kennedy approved the clandestine back-channel communication. He overruled the objections of CIA director John McCone who insisted on safeguarding the agency's right to covertly continue its efforts to overthrow Castro. "We ought to concentrate on the missiles now," Kennedy determined. "It probably won't get any place," but "time is running out for us." 

In a top secret/eyes only cable from the Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon in Rio, Rusk stated that it was time to "discuss with Castro alone RPT alone" a way out of the missile crisis.  He instructed Gordon to meet with Brazil's foreign minister and ask him to have this message transmitted to Castro as if it was a Brazilian initiative:

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